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Confidence is the ‘feeling of knowing’ that accompanies decision making. Bayesian 
theory proposes that confidence is a function solely of the perceived probability of 
being correct. Empirical research has suggested, however, that different individuals 
may perform different computations to estimate confidence from uncertain evidence. 
To test this hypothesis, we collected confidence reports in a task where subjects made 
categorical decisions about the mean of a sequence. We found that for most 
individuals, confidence did indeed reflect the perceived probability of being correct. 
However, in approximately half of them, confidence also reflected a different 
probabilistic quantity: the perceived uncertainty in the estimated variable. We found 
that the contribution of both quantities was stable over weeks. We also observed that 
the influence of the perceived probability of being correct was stable across two tasks, 
one perceptual and one cognitive. Overall, our findings provide a computational 
interpretation of individual differences in human confidence.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
Introduction 
Understanding the computational basis of individual differences in human cognition has 
fundamental implications for medical and biological sciences, as well as for economics and 
the social sciences. A prime example is confidence, which plays a key role in a wide range of 
aspects in life, including learning to make better decisions1, monitoring our actions2, 
cooperating effectively with others3, 4, and displaying good political judgment5. One of the most 
intriguing features of confidence is that humans tend to communicate this feeling in a largely 
idiosyncratic way: although confidence reports are typically stable within each person, they 
tend to be variable across the population6, 7. For instance, different individuals performing the 
same task generate distributions of confidence ratings with different mean and shape7. In 
addition, the correlation between confidence and objective performance varies for different 
people, and is related to individual variations in brain structure8 and connectivity9, 10. While a 
vast literature has focused on the biological correlates of individual differences in human 
confidence8-10, the computational roots of this phenomenon remain unclear.  
Previous research in sensory psychophysics8, 11 and value-based decision making10, 
assumed that confidence is a function solely of the perceived probability of being correct. This 
assumption is reasonable: confidence should reflect only this subjective probability12-14. Driven 
by this normative framework, previous studies explained differences among people as 
measurement noise15, or as individual differences in the ability to report the probability of being 
correct8, 9. This may have been an oversimplification: there is extensive literature showing that 
confidence is influenced by factors other than the probability of being correct16, such as the 
reliability of sensory stimuli2, 13, the magnitude of sensory data11, post-decisional biases17, and 
even personality traits7. 
Here we set out to determine what probabilistic quantities, besides perceived 
probability of being correct, contribute to individual differences in human confidence. We 
focused on a categorical task, in which subjects had to decide whether the mean of a set of 
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items was above or below a decision boundary, and then report their confidence. For about 
half of the subjects, confidence did depend solely on the perceived probability that they were 
correct. However, for the other half, confidence also depended on a different statistical 
quantity: their uncertainty in the estimate of the mean18, 19. Moreover, the dependence of 
confidence on the perceived probability of being correct and uncertainty was stable across 
experiments performed weeks apart. Finally, the dependence of confidence on the perceived 
probability of being correct was stable across tasks involving uncertainty in the perceptual and 
cognitive domain, but the dependence on the perceived uncertainty was not. This is consistent 
with the predictions of a recent theoretical account arguing that uncertainty is encoded by 
domain-specific neural populations14. Overall, these findings provide a computational 
interpretation of individual differences in the human sense of confidence.  
 
Results 
In a perceptual task (Experiment 1), participants observed a sequence of 30 tilted Gabor 
patches presented at the fovea in rapid (4 Hz) serial visual presentation (Fig.1a). At the end 
of the sequence, participants decided whether the mean orientation of the patches was 
clockwise or counter-clockwise relative to vertical. Participants then reported how confident 
they were in their decision on a scale from 1 to 6. To manipulate uncertainty, we pseudo-
randomly drew the orientation samples from uniform distributions with exactly the same mean 
(+3 degrees or -3 degrees) but different variances on different trials (Fig. 1b). Participants 
performed better as variance decreased (Fig. 1c, one-way repeated measures ANOVA, 
F(3,29)=231.4, p<10-10).  
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      [1] 
To fit the choices of each participant, we assumed that they keep track of the mean 
orientation, which they update after each stimulus presentation. To update their estimate of 
the mean within each trial, we considered a model in which participants combine a noisy 
estimate of the current sample with their previous estimate of the mean,  
𝜇𝑖 = (1 − 𝜆) 𝜇𝑖−1 + 𝜆 𝜃𝑖 + 𝛾 𝜃𝑖𝜉𝑖  
where 𝜇𝑖 is the estimate of the mean after 𝑖 samples (𝜇0 = 0), 0 < 𝜆 < 1 determines the 
relative weighting of recent versus more distant samples, 𝜃𝑖 is the actual orientation of the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ 
sample in the sequence,  𝜉𝑖 is sampled from the standard normal distribution, and 𝛾 is a free 
parameter indicating the strength of the noise. The multiplicative nature of the noise ensures 
that the uncertainty in the update of the estimate scales with the size of the observed sample, 
𝜃𝑖. At the end of the sequence, choice is determined by the sign of the final value of the mean 
(𝜇30): the agent chooses clockwise if 𝜇30 is positive, and counter-clockwise if 𝜇30 is negative.  
 This model explains two important quantitative patterns observed in our behavioural 
data. First, all items in the sequence had a significant influence on choice (regression weights 
against zero, t(29)>3.17, p<0.003 for all items), but later samples had more influence than 
earlier ones (slope of regression weights against zero, t(29)=4.70, p=10-6). This recency effect 
was modulated by the learning rate 𝜆 (Supplementary Fig. 1). Second, we observed that 
items in high variance sequences had smaller influence on choice (F(3,29)=57.8, p~0) 
indicating larger integration noise in these trials. The last term in Equation [1], modulated by 
𝛾, captures this pattern (Supplementary Fig. 2).  
We also tested an alternative model that tracks the mean of the sequence in a 
deterministic way, and then makes stochastic decisions. This model, however, failed to explain 
the trend in Fig. 1c, which shows that performance increases as variance decreases (see 
Supplementary Fig. 3 for details and model comparison).  
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      [2] 
Computation of confidence 
In this task, confidence should reflect the perceived probability of being correct, for which 
participants need to have an estimate of the variance of 𝜇30. We assumed that they are able 
to compute the true variance associated with Equation [1] (although our findings do not require 
this assumption, see Supplementary Notes). Thus, perceived variance, denoted 𝜎30
2 , is given 
by 
𝜎30
2 = 𝛾2 ∑(1 − 𝜆)2(30−𝑖)
30
𝑖=1
𝜃𝑖
2. 
The model described by Equations [1] and [2], which we call the stochastic updating model, is 
illustrated in Fig. 2a. Given 𝜇30 and 𝜎30
2 , subjects can compute, on each trial, the perceived 
probability of being correct, ?̂?(correct) (shaded area under the Gaussian distribution in Fig. 
2a).  
Using this model, we estimated the expected values of ?̂?(correct) for different variance 
conditions (see Methods, Equation [9], and Fig. 2b). When we separated by correct and 
incorrect trials, we observed a pattern that has been suggested based on normative 
arguments15, 20: confidence on correct trials should increase as the variance decreases, 
whereas confidence on error trials should show the opposite effect, and decrease as the 
variance decreases. We did not, however, observe this pattern in our data, at least not on 
average: as shown in Fig. 1d, confidence on correct trials did indeed increase as variance 
dropped, but on error trials confidence was relatively independent of variance (F(3,29) = 0.57, 
p = 0.63). 
This last observation indicates that, again on average, subjects were misestimating 
confidence: they should have been less confident on low-variance error trials than in high-
variance error trials, as their probability of being correct was lower (dashed curve in Fig. 2b). 
This suggests that subjects partially based their confidence on the uncertainty in the value of 
the mean orientation – a reasonable, if suboptimal, heuristic. Under this heuristic, low-variance 
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trials would raise their confidence relative to high-variance ones. An appropriate weighting of 
perceived probability of being correct, shown in Fig. 2b, and a function of uncertainty such as 
the observed Fisher information (the inverse of 𝜎30
2 ), shown in Fig. 2c, could, therefore, explain 
the confidence ratings observed in Fig. 1d.  
To formally test this proposal, we compared the normative model of confidence based 
on only ?̂?(correct) with 7 alternative models based on different linear combinations of 
?̂?(correct), mean, standard deviation, variance and Fisher information (Supplementary 
Figure 4). We evaluated which combination provided a better fit to confidence ratings using 
ordinal logistic regressions (see Methods). The normative model based on just ?̂?(correct) had 
one parameter per subject, whereas the alternative models had two parameters for each 
participant. Our data supported extending the normative model by adding a second parameter, 
uncertainty in the estimated mean, quantified by either standard deviation, variance or Fisher 
information (Wilcoxon sign-rank test for deviance:  z = 4.78, p = 10-6  for standard deviation; z 
= 4.73, p = 10-6; for variance; z = 4.73, p = 10-6 for Fisher information). These three models 
were statistically indistinguishable from each other (z < 1.7, p > 0.1 for all pairwise 
comparisons, see Supplementary Fig. 4 for more details). 
 This analysis indicates that uncertainty in orientation does indeed influence 
confidence. To analyse this finding in more detail – and in particular to quantitatively examine 
inter-subject differences – we need to choose a particular function of uncertainty. Because 
standard deviation, variance and Fisher information are related by invertible transformations, 
it is fundamentally impossible to determine which function is used by the brain (see 
Supplementary Notes). Instead, we ask which quantity is the best linear predictor of 
confidence in an ordinal regression model.  
To do that, we conducted a separate experiment in which the perceived probability of 
being correct played no role. We asked participants to estimate the average orientation in the 
sequence of Gabor patches and to rate their confidence (see Control Experiment in 
Methods). This experiment was very similar to Experiment 1: on each trial the angles of the 
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Gabor patches were drawn from uniform distributions with one of four different variances (the 
same used in Experiment 1). However, rather than just two possible means, the mean was 
randomly chosen from a uniform distribution over the whole range of orientations. 
Consequently, participants did not make a categorical decision, as in the previous experiment; 
instead, they estimated the value of the mean. Therefore, their reported confidence was not 
about the probability that they were correct, but about their uncertainty in the estimate of the 
mean. As the variance in the sequence decreased, responses were more accurate (F(3,9) = 
13.21, p = 10-5) and more confident (F(3,9) = 37.4, p = 10-9, see Supplementary Fig. 5). We 
regressed confidence against single-trial estimates of either Fisher information, variance or 
standard deviation. These fits were significantly better when using Fisher information rather 
than variance (Wilcoxon sign-rank test for difference in log-likelihood, z=2.8, p=0.005) or 
standard deviation (z=2.9, p=0.004). These results suggest that it is reasonable to use Fisher 
information to quantify uncertainty. (For additional details, see Methods and Supplementary 
Figure 5). 
Individual differences and their stability over time 
The analysis presented so far is based on population-averaged data (Fig. 1d), so it is 
uninformative about differences among individuals. To determine whether, and how, 
?̂?(correct) and Fisher information influence confidence within subjects, we looked at the data 
of each individual. As expected6, 7, we observed substantial inter-individual differences (Fig. 
3). Some subjects did indeed base confidence solely on ?̂?(correct). However, in approximately 
half of them, confidence appeared to be influenced – at least to some degree – by Fisher 
information. To quantify this, we regressed21 confidence reports against model-based 
estimates of ?̂?(correct) and information. Fig. 3 shows a scatter plot of the regression weights 
for ?̂?(correct) and Fisher information. In 13 out of the 30 participants, confidence significantly 
reflected ?̂?(correct) but not information. In 14 other participants, however, confidence 
significantly reflected both ?̂?(correct) and information. One participant’s confidence conveyed 
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only information but not ?̂?(correct), and finally, for two participants, confidence did not reflect 
either of the two quantities.  
The ordinal regression identified seven parameters for each individual (see Methods, 
Equation [10]): a weight for ?̂?(correct), denoted 𝛽𝑝; a weight for information, denoted 𝛽𝐼; and 
five parameters 𝛼𝑗 (𝑗 = 1, … ,5). The latter are the average log odds of observing a confidence 
rating greater than 𝑗; from these we selected the mid-value, 𝛼3, which is based on splitting the 
confidence scale in halves. The parameter 𝛼3 was correlated with the average confidence 
across the entire experiment (r=0.84, p<10-8), and so indicates how under- or overconfident a 
given participant is; we thus refer to 𝛼3 as the overall confidence. We confirmed that individual 
differences in these parameters (𝛽𝑝,𝛽𝐼, and 𝛼3) are not simply explained by how well our model 
fit decisions (see Supplementary Notes). The three selected variables were uncorrelated 
with each other across the population (r<0.35, p>0.1 for all pairwise comparisons between 𝛽𝑝, 
𝛽𝐼, and 𝛼3).  
Finally, we note that while subjects were required to report confidence, they did not 
explicitly use it to, for example, regulate learning1 or make collective decisions3. Thus, we 
know only that 𝛽𝑝 and 𝛽𝐼 link perceived probability of being correct and Fisher information to 
confidence reports, which could in principle differ from internal computations of confidence11. 
To explore this issue, we regressed reaction time against perceived probability of being correct 
and Fisher information, as previous studies have shown that reaction time correlates with the 
computation of confidence22, 23. The regression coefficients based on reaction time were highly 
correlated with 𝛽𝑝 and 𝛽𝐼 (Supplementary Fig. 6), suggesting that confidence ratings reflected 
the computation of confidence.  
This analysis would be no more than a model-fitting exercise if a different profile – that 
is, a different relationship between confidence, ?̂?(correct), and Fisher information – emerged 
when the same participants were retested. To test for stability, in Experiment 2 we retested 
14 of the participants from Experiment 1 approximately one month later. We observed that the 
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three variables (𝛽𝑝,𝛽𝐼,𝛼3) were correlated across experiments (Fig. 4), indicating that this 
decomposition is stable across time and informative of the identity of the participants. To 
further validate this observation, we found that the distance in the 3-dimensional space defined 
by (𝛽𝑝,𝛽𝐼,𝛼3) within participants (across the two experiments) was smaller than the distance 
between different participants within an experiment (Wilcoxon rank sum test, z=4.0, p<10-4). 
This shows that our computational model of confidence is stable across different experimental 
sessions (see Discussion for comparison with previous studies). 
Consistency across tasks  
To determine whether subjects compute confidence the same way across tasks – that is, 
whether they give the same weight to ?̂?(correct) and Fisher information, and have the same 
overall confidence – we repeated our experiments on a cognitive task: averaging a sequence 
of numbers. In Experiment 3, a new group of 20 participants performed, in counterbalanced 
order, the visual task described above and a numerical averaging task (Fig. 5). In the 
numerical task, we presented two-digit numbers, updated at the same rate as in Experiment 
1 (4 Hz). The task was to decide whether the mean of the sequence was greater or smaller 
than 50. Uncertainty was manipulated in the same way as in Experiment 1, using a set of 
variances that ensured comparable performance across tasks (see Methods).  
In both tasks, accuracy increased with decreasing variance (Fig. 5a,b). A two-way 
repeated measures ANOVA with factors “variance” and “task” showed a significant main effect 
of variance (F(3,19)=194.3, p<10-10) but a non-significant effect of task (F(1,19)=2.5, p=0.13) or 
interaction (F(3,19)=0.84, p=0.47). Importantly, replicating Experiment 1, variance did not 
modulate confidence in error decisions (F(3,19)=0.2, p=0.89 for the visual task; F(3,19)=1.1, p=0.4 
for the numerical task). Confidence in the visual task was not statistically different from 
confidence in the numerical task (F(1,19)=1.58, p=0.22, Fig. 5c,d).  
As in the visual task, later numbers had more influence on choice than earlier numbers 
(F(5,19)=18.0, p=10-12) (Supplementary Fig. 1), and numbers in the high variance condition 
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had a smaller influence on choice than number in the low variance condition (F(3,19)=19.4, 
p=10-9) (Supplementary Fig. 2). We therefore used the same stochastic updating model 
(Equations [1] and [2]) to fit the data in Experiment 3. Also consistent with the visual task, 
decisions were better fit by this model than the alternative model we considered in the visual 
task (log-likelihood of the difference against zero: t(19)=5.2, p<10-4 for the cognitive task; 
t(19)=6.4, p<10-5 for the perceptual task). We regressed confidence against ?̂?(correct) and 
Fisher information, and, as in Experiment 1, about half the subjects based confidence solely 
on ?̂?(correct), and about half also took into account Fisher information (see Supplementary 
Figs. 7 and 8). We also provided independent evidence that, in the numerical task, Fisher 
information was more linearly predictive of confidence reports than other functions of variance 
(Supplementary Fig. 5). 
We asked if our three regressors (𝛽𝑝, 𝛽𝐼 and 𝛼3) were consistent across the numerical 
and visual tasks. The within-participants distance in the 3-dimensional space was smaller than 
the between-participants distance (Wilcoxon rank sum test, z=3.3, p<0.001), suggesting that 
they were – at least in aggregate. And indeed, the weight of perceived probability of being 
correct, 𝛽𝑝, and the overall confidence, 𝛼3, were significantly correlated across tasks (r=0.74, 
p<0.001 and r=0.63, p<0.01, respectively). However, the weight of Fisher information, 𝛽𝐼, was 
uncorrelated across tasks (r=0.20, p=0.37), indicating that Fisher information has 
quantitatively different effects on confidence in visual and numerical tasks (Fig. 6). This result 
is in agreement with a recent theoretical account arguing that the inverse variance is 
represented by domain-specific neural populations14 (see Discussion).  
Discussion 
The computations underlying confidence have attracted considerable attention over the last 
several years, in part due to recent developments in model-based approaches12-14 combined 
with neurophysiological recordings in non-human animals24-26 and neuroimaging in humans8-
10, 27. The standard approach consists of fitting a model to the entire population and treating 
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inter-individual variability as noise11, 15. However, if such individual differences are robust over 
time, and consistent across tasks7, then treating them as noise limits our understanding of the 
computational processes underlying confidence. Here we found that inter-individual 
differences in confidence ratings are meaningful in terms of their underlying computations. In 
particular, we found that different individuals used different weightings for two probabilistic 
quantities: their perceived probability of being correct, and their uncertainty in their estimate 
of the task-relevant variable14, the latter quantified by the observed Fisher information18, 19. We 
isolated the contribution of each of these two quantities to confidence, and measured, for each 
individual: 1) the influence of the perceived probability of being correct on confidence (𝛽𝑝), 2) 
the influence of Fisher information on confidence (𝛽𝐼), and 3) the participants’ overall 
confidence (𝛼3). All three variables were stable across several weeks (Fig. 4), and two of them 
(𝛽𝑝 and 𝛼3) were stable across different tasks – one in the perceptual domain; the other in the 
cognitive domain (Fig. 6).  
Normative theories of decision-making postulate that confidence should depend solely 
on the probability of being correct12-14. We speculate that the perceived uncertainty about task-
relevant variables could serve as a mental shortcut – a convenient heuristic – that provides a 
proxy for the probability of being correct28. This shortcut is reasonable, as uncertainty 
correlates with decision performance in our experiments (Figs. 1c and 2c). Previous research 
in our group showed that confidence can reflect the magnitude of sensory data11, a choice-
independent quantity that also correlates with behavioural performance. Our finding that a 
heuristic computation modulates confidence judgements about categorical decisions is in line 
with this study.  
Our model of confidence assumes that subjects linearly combine the normative 
computation of ?̂?(correct) with a function of variance. However, we cannot rule out the 
possibility that subjects compute ?̂?(correct) suboptimally – for example, by partially basing it 
on the uncertainty in the task relevant variable – and then computing confidence based solely 
on their suboptimal estimate of ?̂?(correct). While further experiments are needed to 
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disentangle these alternatives, we consider the former explanation to be more likely than the 
latter. Indeed, many studies suggest that confidence is a multivariate function that depends 
on factors such as the structure of the task11, the social context29, and post-decisional biases17.  
Previous research has shown reliable individual differences in the mean and shape of 
the distribution of confidence ratings6, 7, and in the extent to which confidence predicts 
behavioural accuracy7, 8.  These properties are believed to be idiosyncratic and correlate with 
individual variations in personality trait7, brain structure8, and resting-state functional 
connectivity9. For example, individual differences in the correlation between confidence and 
accuracy were systematically linked to a frontal network including the anterior prefrontal 
cortex, ventro-medial prefrontal cortex, and rostro-lateral prefrontal cortex8, 10, 30, 31. These 
findings were based on decisions in a wide range of contexts, including visual8 and value-
based10 judgments. Although these studies provided interesting insights about the brain 
regions that correlate with individual differences in confidence, none of them explicitly asked 
what probabilistic quantities influence this variability.  
Here, we provide empirical evidence that the idiosyncratic nature of confidence is due 
to differences in the computation of confidence; more specifically, different individuals place 
different weighting on the perceived probability of being correct and the perceived uncertainty 
in the estimate of the task-relevant variable. In principle, we could have used any function of 
variance to quantify uncertainty, and indeed all tested functions provide equally good fits in 
our categorical task (see Supplementary Fig. 4). We chose to model the influence of 
uncertainty as linear changes in Fisher information (inverse variance) only because it provided 
the best linear fits to confidence in a separate experiment (see Supplementary Fig. 5).  
The idea that the inverse variance could modulate confidence has been previously 
proposed and tested in several studies1, 2, 17, 32, 33. In ref. 32, subjects judged the mean 
orientation of a set of lines, and found that confidence reports underweighted the stimulus 
variance32. However, whether the model parameters of that study were stable over time or 
consistent across domains remains unknown. In ref. 33, participants observed random-dot 
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motion in two conditions: one with low mean and low variance, and the other one with high 
mean and high variance33. Although performance was the same for both conditions, some 
participants gave higher confidence ratings in one condition or the other. A model in which 
different subjects gave different weights to signal-to-noise ratio and inverse variance fit these 
data but, critically, the fit was unstable over time (the weight of signal-to-noise ratio was 
uncorrelated across a test-retest). In principle, this is at odds with our finding that the weight 
of ?̂?(correct) was stable over time. However, we should emphasise that the signal-to-noise 
ratio is different than ?̂?(correct): while the signal-to-noise ratio is an objective quantity that 
depends only on stimulus properties, ?̂?(correct) is a subjective quantity that depends on the 
decision and how the subject learned about the stimulus (see Equations [5] to [9] in Methods). 
Here, instead of fitting confidence against physical properties of the stimuli, we focused 
on a normative theory based on the perceived (rather than the actual) probability of being 
correct, and explained individual differences in confidence as systematic deviations from this 
theory. This decomposition fit our data better than a linear combination of the stimulus mean 
and variance (Supplementary Fig. 4). Our work thus provides a robust model of individual 
differences in confidence, with all parameters stable over time (Fig. 4). Finally, we evaluated 
the reliability of this computational model of confidence across domains, which suggested a 
relationship between specific model components and their neural encoding.  
An implication of our behavioural findings is that neurons representing confidence 
should receive input both from populations encoding the perceived probability of being correct 
and from populations encoding uncertainty. Because of differences in connectivity (which are 
likely to arise during learning and development) different individuals should have different 
weightings for these two quantities; that is, different values of 𝛽𝑝 and 𝛽𝐼. That is exactly what 
we found (Fig. 3). Furthermore, if connectivity changes slowly – a reasonable assumption in 
the absence of learning – 𝛽𝑝 and 𝛽𝐼 would be stable over time. Again, that is exactly what we 
found (Fig. 4).  
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 This does not, however, explain the fact that 𝛽𝑝 is invariant across tasks whereas 𝛽𝐼 is 
not (Figs. 6a, b). For that, we need to consider how ?̂?(correct) and uncertainty are encoded. 
Because the probability of being correct is a dimensionless quantity, and is universal across 
different sources of uncertainty, it is reasonable to assume that it is encoded by a domain-
general circuitry – for instance, by neurons in the prefrontal cortex8, 10, 30, 31. In contrast, 
uncertainty – whether it is Fisher information, variance or standard deviation (see 
Supplementary Notes) – is a quantity with dimension, and so is likely to be encoded by 
domain-specific populations14. For example, in the case of the visual task, uncertainty could 
be represented by neurons in primary visual cortex that are tuned to orientation34; and indeed, 
sensory uncertainty can be decoded from activity in the visual cortex35. In the same manner, 
numerical uncertainty could be represented by neurons in the parietal cortex tuned to different 
numerical quantities36, although this has not yet been tested. 
Under the assumption that the perceived probability of being correct is encoded by 
domain-invariant populations, the influence of this quantity on confidence should be stable 
across domains. This would explain our results in Fig. 6a: 𝛽𝑝 was correlated across the visual 
and numerical tasks. Likewise, under the assumption that uncertainty is encoded by domain-
invariant populations, the influence of this quantity on confidence should vary across domains.  
This would explain our results in Fig. 6b: 𝛽𝐼 was not correlated across the visual and numerical 
tasks. 
 These are, of course, hypotheses. They do, though, make testable predictions. First, 
neural circuits encoding confidence should show different functional connectivity with those 
encoding visual versus numerical uncertainty. Second, different participants should have 
different relative strength of these two forms of connectivity, co-varying with their behavioural 
differences. Future experiments combining behavioural data, computational modelling, and 
neural recordings could test these predictions. 
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The value of investigating individual differences in human behaviour and cognition was 
first recognised in the psychological sciences, with a special interest in high-level aspects such 
as intelligence37 and personality38. More recently, technical advances in magnetic resonance 
imaging have made it possible to develop a cognitive neuroscience of individual differences39, 
40. Findings include neural correlates of individual differences in motor behaviour41, visual 
perception42, mood43, social network size44, and confidence8-10. While these studies provide 
valuable insights into the neural basis of inter-individual differences in human cognition, the 
mechanisms responsible for such differences remain unknown. To overcome this limitation, 
the next challenge is to build a computational neuroscience of individual differences. A first 
step in this direction is to understand the computations performed by healthy adults leading to 
inter-individual variability in behaviour. Our study provides a computational model of 
consistent individual differences in confidence, paving the way towards determining how these 
computations change under development45, aging46, and psychiatric disorders47. 
 
Methods 
 
Participants 
60 healthy adults (aged 18-45, 43 right-handed, 31 female) with normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision participated in this study. All participants were recruited through advertisement at 
University College London, and gave written informed consent. We collected data from 94 
experimental sessions lasting approximately 90 minutes each. Participants were paid £10 per 
hour. All experimental procedures were approved by the research ethics committee at 
University College London. 
Display  
Stimuli were generated using the Cogent Toolbox (http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/cogent.php) for 
MATLAB (Mathworks Inc). Participants observed an LCD display (21-inches monitor; refresh 
rate: 60 Hz; resolution: 1024 × 768 pixels) at a viewing distance of approximately 60 cm.  
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Experiment 1: Visual task 
30 participants performed Experiment 1, which consisted of an orientation averaging task (Fig. 
1). Observers viewed a sequence of 30 tilted Gabor patches over a middle grey background 
(standard deviation of the Gaussian envelope: 0.63 deg; spatial frequency: 1.57 cycles deg-1; 
contrast: 25%) flashed in rapid succession at the centre of the screen. Each patch was 
presented for 200 ms with an inter-stimulus interval of 50 ms, resulting in an update rate of 4 
Hz. Once the sequence finished, participants were asked to judge whether the mean 
orientation of the patches was tilted clockwise or counter-clockwise relative to the vertical. The 
response alternatives consisted of two tilted lines presented in the left and right visual field 
(size: 2.2 deg, location: 11.3 deg left or right to the centre of the screen). The position of the 
response alternatives was randomly assigned and counter-balanced across trials. To select 
the option displayed in the left, participants pressed the ‘Q’ button of a QWERTY keyboard 
using the left hand; to select the option on the right, they pressed the ‘P’ button. Participants 
were then asked to report their confidence on a rating scale from 1 to 6. A horizontal line was 
presented at the centre of the screen (length: 18.9 deg) with 6 equally-spaced marks signalling 
different levels of confidence. Participants moved a cursor to the left or right of the scale by 
pressing the ‘Q’ or ‘P’ buttons respectively. The initial point in the scale was randomly chosen 
on a trial-by-trial basis. Once the participants selected a confidence rating, they pressed the 
space bar to continue. After an inter-trial interval (which was uniformly distributed between 0.7 
and 0.9 seconds), a new trial began.  
The orientations of the patches were drawn from uniform distributions with mean m 
and endpoints m±v. We used distributions with two different means (m = +3 or -3 degrees) 
and four different variances (given by their different endpoints: v = 10, 14, 24, or 45 degrees). 
Uniform distributions were pseudo-randomly sampled such that the mean was exactly ±3 
degrees on every trial. This generated weak correlations, but multi-collinearity analyses 
indicated that presentations could not be predicted from previous samples (R2<0.07). 
Orientations were randomly shuffled to define the presentation order. The experiment 
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consisted of 400 trials: 50 trials for each of the eight distributions. Blocked feedback was given 
every 20 trials by a message displaying the number of correct trials in that block. Each block 
comprised 5 trials of each variance condition presented in random order. Therefore, 
performance for different variance conditions could not be learned from feedback. 
Experiment 2: Stability across time 
All participants of Experiment 1 were invited to perform the visual task a second time, 
approximately one month later. 14 participants accepted the invitation and were re-tested. 
Experiment 2 was performed 35.2±2.4 days after Experiment 1 (range: 23-49 days). 
Experimenters were blind to the results of Experiment 1 when testing participants in 
Experiment 2.   
Experiment 3: Stability across the perceptual and cognitive domain 
20 healthy adults who did not participate in Experiment 1 or 2 performed Experiment 3. 
Participants performed two sessions: the visual task described in Experiment 1 and a 
numerical averaging task. Half of the participants performed the visual task first. The second 
session was performed 9.7±2.9 days (range: 1-27 days) after the first one. Experimenters 
were blind to the results of the first session when testing the participants in the second session. 
The numerical task was identical in structure to the visual task but, instead of Gabor 
patches, two-digit numbers (size: 3.8 deg; font: Arial) were presented. The colour of the 
numbers (black or white over a middle grey background) was randomly chosen at each 
presentation. Participants were instructed to decide whether the mean of the sequence was 
greater or smaller than 50. Numbers were sampled from uniform distributions with mean m = 
47 or m = 53, and endpoints m±v were defined by v = 7, 9, 11 or 33. These values were 
chosen, through pilot experiments with a different set of participants, to obtain performances 
similar to that observed in Experiment 1. Uniform distributions were pseudo-randomly sampled 
such that the mean of the sequence was exactly m on each trial. We performed the same 
multi-collinearity analysis of Experiment 1, and found that presentations could not be predicted 
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from previous samples (R2<0.06). Decisions were collected in the same way as in Experiment 
1: a response screen with two options (“smaller” and “greater”) was presented on both sides 
of the visual field. Participants gave their answer, and indicated confidence, using the same 
keys as in the visual task.  
Control Experiment 
Ten healthy adults (aged 20-45, 6 female, all right-handed) who had not participated in 
Experiment 1, 2 or 3 participated in the Control Experiment. The experiment consisted of one 
visual and one numerical task that subjects performed in a single session of approximately 90 
minutes. Half of the participants performed the visual task first. Participants observed a 
sequence of items serially flashed at the fovea at 4 Hz, and were asked to provide their analog 
estimate of the mean. To rate their confidence, participants moved a cursor over a continuous 
horizontal line. All other parameters (length of the sequence, colour, contrast, brightness, 
viewing distance, etc.) were identical to our main study.  
In the visual task, participants observed tilted Gabor patches. The mean of the 
distribution was uniformly sampled across the entire circle. After observing 30 items, we 
presented a line in the centre of the screen, initialized at a random orientation. Participants 
then moved the mouse horizontally to change its orientation until they matched the perceived 
mean in the sequence. In the numerical task, participants observed two-digit numbers. We 
uniformly sampled the mean between 44 and 66 (to ensure that all numbers were between 11 
and 99 in the condition with higher variance). Participants typed their answer using a keyboard. 
Model fitting 
To fit the stochastic updating model (Equations [1] and [2]) to the participants’ decisions, we 
find, for each individual, the parameters 𝜆 and 𝛾 that maximise the log likelihood, 
log 𝐿(𝜆, 𝛾) = ∑
1 + 𝑑𝑘
2
 log Φ (
?̅?30,𝑘(𝜆)
𝜎30,𝑘(𝜆, 𝛾)
) +
1 − 𝑑𝑘
2
 log [1 − Φ (
?̅?30,𝑘(𝜆)
𝜎30,𝑘(𝜆, 𝛾)
)]
𝑁𝑡𝑟
𝑘=1
  [3] 
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where Φ is the standard cumulative normal function, 𝑑𝑘 is the decision on trial 𝑘 (+1 if 
clockwise, -1 if counter-clockwise), 𝜎30,𝑘(𝜆, 𝛾) is obtained from Equation [2], 𝑁𝑡𝑟 is the number 
of trials, and  
?̅?30,𝑘(𝜆) =  𝜆 ∑(1 − 𝜆)
30−𝑖
30
𝑖=1
𝜃𝑖,𝑘 
is the mean value of 𝜇30 on trial 𝑘. (A minor technical point: Equation [4] describes the visual 
task; the cognitive task is the same except that the mean is offset by 50.) 
Estimating the Fisher information and the perceived probability of being correct 
Based on the best fitting parameters 𝜆 and 𝛾 derived from the stochastic updating model (the 
values of 𝜆 and 𝛾 that maximize 𝐿(𝜆, 𝛾) in Equation [2]), we estimated, on a trial-by-trial basis, 
the observed Fisher information and the expected perceived probability of being correct. The 
observed Fisher information is just the inverse variance of the participants’ estimate, the latter 
computed via Equation [2] (Fig. 2a). The expected perceived probability of having made a 
correct decision, 𝑑, is given by 
?̂?(correct|?̅?30, 𝜎30, 𝑑) = ∫ 𝑑𝜇30 ?̂?(correct|𝜇30, 𝜎30) 𝑝(𝜇30|?̅?30, 𝜎30, 𝑑) .
+∞
−∞
 
The first term inside the integral, ?̂?(correct|𝜇30, 𝜎30), is the shaded area under the Gaussian in 
Fig. 2a; consequently, it is given by the cumulative normal distribution, 
?̂?(correct|𝜇30, 𝜎30) =  Φ (
|𝜇30|
𝜎30
) . 
The second term in the integral, 𝑝(𝜇30|?̅?30, 𝜎30, 𝑑), is the probability of observing 𝜇30 given ?̅?30, 
𝜎30, and, importantly, the decision, 𝑑. If the decision is clockwise (𝑑 = +1), 𝜇30 must be 
positive, whereas if the decision is counterclockwise (𝑑 = −1), 𝜇30 must be negative. We can 
take these constraints into account using the Heaviside step function, Θ(𝑥) (which is 1 if 𝑥 > 0 
and 0 otherwise), yielding 
 [4] 
 [5] 
 [6] 
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𝑝(𝜇30|?̅?30, 𝜎30) =  
1
𝑍
𝑒
− 
(𝜇30−?̅?30)
2
2𝜎30
2
√2𝜋𝜎30
2
Θ(𝜇30𝑑) 
where 𝑍 is the normalisation constant,  
𝑍 = ∫  𝑑𝜇30Θ(𝜇30𝑑)
𝑒
− 
(𝜇30−?̅?30)
2
2𝜎30
2
√2𝜋𝜎30
2
= Φ (
?̅?30 𝑑
𝜎30
).  
+∞
−∞
 
Combining these two expressions, we have 
?̂?(correct|?̅?30, 𝜎30, 𝑑) =  
1
𝑍
∫ 𝑑𝜇30
𝑒
− 
(𝜇30−?̅?30)
2
2𝜎30
2
√2𝜋𝜎30
2
Θ(𝜇30𝑑) Φ (
|𝜇30|
𝜎30
)
+∞
−∞
. 
On each trial, ?̂?(correct|?̅?30, 𝜎30, 𝑑) was computed numerically using Matlab. Note that 
the expected perceived probability of being correct (Equation [9]) is dependent on the 
decision, 𝑑, whereas the Fisher information (Equation [2], Fig.2a) does not depend on 𝑑, and 
so is choice-independent. 
Ordinal regression of confidence reports 
We ran for each individual a multivariate ordinal regression21. For each of the five possible 
splits in the rating scale, this regression fits a logistic model with fixed effects and different 
offsets,  
log (
𝑝(𝑐 > 𝑗)
1 − 𝑝(𝑐 > 𝑗)
) = −𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽𝑝𝑍𝑝 + 𝛽𝐼𝑍𝐼 
where 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 5, 𝑐 denotes confidence, and 𝑍𝑝 and 𝑍𝐼 are z-scored estimates of the perceived 
probability of being correct and Fisher information on each trial. The outputs of this regression 
are the offsets 𝛼1, … , 𝛼5, and the weights 𝛽𝑝 and 𝛽𝐼. To summarise the computations 
underlying confidence, we selected 𝛼3 (the offset when splitting the scale in halves, which we 
refer to as the overall confidence), 𝛽𝑝 (the weight of the probability of being correct on 
confidence) and 𝛽𝐼 (the weight of information on confidence).  
 [10] 
 [7] 
 [8] 
 [9] 
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Statistical analyses 
In Experiment 1, we computed the average performance for each variance condition and each 
participant. These values were submitted to a one-way repeated measures analysis of 
variance (rm-ANOVA) with factor “variance condition” (4 levels) and “participant” (30 levels) 
as repeated measure (Fig. 1). The normality assumption of this test was checked using the 
Lilliefors test (k=0.7, c=0.8, p=0.07). We also computed the average confidence rating for each 
variance condition and each participant, conditioned on correct or incorrect trials, and 
submitted those values to a two-way rm-ANOVA with factors “variance condition” (4 levels), 
“outcome” (2 levels: correct or incorrect), and “participant” (30 levels) as repeated measure 
(Fig. 2c). The normality assumption of this test was checked using the Lilliefors test (k=0.04, 
c=0.06, p>0.5). The goodness of the fit for each model and subject (Supplementary Fig. 1b), 
quantified by the negative log-likelihood (Equation [3]), was submitted to a two-sided paired t-
test (29 degrees of freedom). The normality assumption of this test was checked using the 
Lilliefors test (k=0.08, c=0.11, p>0.5). 
In Experiment 2, we compared the within-participants distances in the space defined 
by (𝛽𝑝,𝛽𝐼,𝛼3) with the between-subjects distances. Because we have 14 participants, this 
defines 14 within-subjects distances and 14×13/2=91 between-subjects distances. We z-
scored each dimension and used the Euclidean metric to compute distance. The Lilliefors test 
rejected the null hypothesis that these values were normal (k=0.1, c=0.08, p=0.01); therefore, 
we used a non-parametric test, the Wilcoxon ranked sum test. This test is unpaired and the 
reported p-value is two-sided. 
In Experiment 3, we computed the average performance for each variance condition, 
task, and participant (Fig. 5a,b). We submitted these values to a two-way rm-ANOVA with 
factors “variance condition” (4 levels), “task” (2 levels), and “participants” (20 levels) as 
repeated measure. The normality assumption of this test was checked using the Lilliefors test 
(k=0.07, c=0.09, p=0.36). We computed the average confidence rating across all conditions 
and participants and performed the same rm-ANOVA used in Experiment 1 (Fig. 5c,d). As in 
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Experiment 1, average confidence was normally distributed (Lilliefors test, k=0.06, c=0.07, 
p=0.17). To evaluate the stability of (𝛽𝑝,𝛽𝐼,𝛼3) across domains, we computed the within- and 
between-subjects distances following the same procedure of Experiment 2, and compared 
these values using the same non-parametric test. 
Data availability 
The data that supports the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author 
upon request. 
Code availability 
The codes that supports the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author 
upon request. 
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Figure 1. Tracking mean evidence in rapid serial visual presentations. (a) 30 tilted Gabor patches were serially 
flashed at the fovea, updated at 4 Hz. Participants made a binary decision about whether the mean in the sequence 
was tilted to the right or left, followed by a confidence rating. Full details of the task are available in Online Methods. 
(b) The samples were drawn from a uniform distribution with mean, m, set to either exactly +3 degrees or exactly 
-3 degrees. The dashed line shows m=+3. The endpoints of the uniform distributions were m±v, with v = 10, 14, 
24, or 45 degrees, yielding four conditions with four different variances. (c) Performance increased with decreasing 
variance. Dots show the average performance across subjects, and vertical lines depict the s.e.m. The solid black 
curve shows the best fit of the stochastic updating model (Equations [1] and [2]). (d) Confidence reports averaged 
over all subjects. Vertical lines show s.e.m. At the population level, confidence in incorrect trials remains 
approximately constant as a function of variance. 
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Figure 2. Estimating confidence. (a) Each trial consists of 30 presentations of tilted Gabor patches. At each 
presentation (𝜃𝑖) the mean (𝜇𝑖) is updated by combining the estimate on the previous sample with a noisy version 
of the current Gabor patch. The black line represents one realisation of the model. At the end of the sequence, the 
subject makes a decision based on the sign of 𝜇30. The subjective probability of being correct and the observed 
Fisher information are then computed according to the equations shown in the right panel; see Online Methods for 
full details. (b) The perceived probability of being correct, ?̂?(correct), averaged over variance condition for correct 
trials (solid grey line) and incorrect trials (dashed black line), and also averaged across participants. For correct 
trials, this quantity increases with decreasing variance (solid grey line); for incorrect trials it shows the opposite 
pattern (dashed black line, see ref. 15 for more details). (c) The uncertainty in the estimate of 𝜇30, quantified by the 
observed Fisher information, increases both for correct and incorrect trials (same markers as panel b).  
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Figure 3. Analysis of confidence across individuals. The main panel in the lower left shows regression weights on 
confidence for different individuals. x-axis: weight of the probability of being correct (𝛽𝑝); y-axis: weight of 
information (𝛽𝐼). Each dot is a different participant, and the colour codes for significance (at the 0.05 level) as 
follows: dark green, only 𝛽𝑝 was significant; light green, both 𝛽𝑝 and 𝛽𝐼 were significant; yellow, only 𝛽𝐼 was 
significant; grey, neither was significant. Insets along the top and right margins show average confidence and 
confidence distributions for four representative participants. Left plots: mean confidence across different variance 
conditions, split by correct (solid grey line) and incorrect (dashed black line) trials. Right plots: probability distribution 
over confidence. For participant #19 (yellow dot), confidence reflected only information: confidence increased with 
variance for incorrect trials. For participant #16 (dark green dot), confidence reflected only the perceived probability 
of being correct: confidence in error trials decreased with increasing variance. For participant #27 (light green dot), 
confidence reflected a mixture of both computations. For participant #24 (grey dot), confidence was not modulated 
by either of these quantities. Note that there are large differences in confidence distributions, with subjects #24 and 
#27 showing far more confidence than subjects #16 and #19. Because 𝛼3 is the fraction of trials with confidence 
larger than 3, that quantity is larger for subjects #24 and #27 than for subjects #16 and #19. 
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Figure 4. Stability across time. 14 participants of Experiment 1 were retested approximately one month later 
(35.2±2.4 days; range = 23-49 days). We probed stability by asking how much our three parameters (𝛽𝑝, 𝛽𝐼 and 
𝛼3) changed across experiments. (a-c) Correlation across experiments for 𝛽𝑝 (a), 𝛽𝐼 (b), and 𝛼3 (c). Each square 
is a different participant, the dotted line is the identity, and the value of r given in each box is the Pearson correlation 
coefficient. The three variables were significantly correlated across experiments, suggesting that this 
decomposition is stable across time. A non-parametric method to measure rank correlation across experiments 
yielded similar results (Spearman’s rank correlation, rs=0.82, p<0.001 for 𝛽𝑝, rs=0.54, p<0.05 for 𝛽𝐼, and rs=0.55, 
p<0.05 for 𝛼3). A robust regression that underweights potential outliers further supported these findings (𝛽𝑝: 
regression coefficient 0.59±0.14, p=0.001; 𝛽𝐼: regression coefficient 0.74±0.27, p=0.02; 𝛼3 regression coefficient 
0.60±0.18, p=0.005). 
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Figure 5. Decisions and confidence in Experiment 3 (N=20). (a,c): Visual task (replication of Experiment 1 with 
different participants; panel a corresponds to Fig. 1c and panel c to Fig. 1d). (b) Same as (a), but for the numerical 
task. (d) Same as (c), but for the numerical task. The similarity between panels a and b, and between panels c 
and d, indicate that, at least on average, the visual and numerical tasks lead to remarkably similar behaviour, 
despite the fact that one is perceptual and the other is cognitive. 
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Figure 6. Consistency across tasks involving uncertainty in the perceptual and cognitive domain. 20 participants 
that were not tested in Experiments 1 or 2 performed one visual and one numerical task (Experiment 3). As in Fig. 
3, we decomposed confidence in terms of the weight of ?̂?(correct) (𝛽𝑝), the weight of information (𝛽𝐼), and the 
overall confidence (𝛼3). (a-c) Correlation across tasks for 𝛽𝑝 (a), 𝛽𝐼 (b), and 𝛼3 (c). Each square is a different 
participant, the dotted line is the identity, and the value of r given in each box indicates the Pearson correlation 
coefficient. 𝛽𝑐 and 𝛼3 were positively correlated across tasks; however, the weights of Fisher information, 𝛽𝐼, were 
uncorrelated across tasks. A non-parametric method to measure the correlation across experiments yielded similar 
results (rs=0.68, p<0.01 for 𝛽𝑝, rs=0.22, p=0.35 for 𝛽𝐼, and rs=0.62, p<0.01 for 𝛼3). 
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Supplementary Notes 
Does goodness of fit explain our findings? 
We asked if individual differences in how well our model fit the decisions could explain the 
inter-individual variability in the parameters 𝛽𝑝, 𝛽𝐼 , and 𝛼3. To do this, we correlated these 
values with the deviance1, a standard metric of quality of the fit,  
𝐷 =  −2(ℒ − 〈ℒ〉), 
where ℒ is the log likelihood of the data, obtained through Equation [3] and 〈ℒ〉 is the log 
likelihood of data that perfectly fits the model (often referred to as a saturated model). In our 
case, 〈ℒ〉 is found by replacing the decision dependent terms in Equation [3] (those that 
depend on 𝑑𝑘) by their probability under the model, leading to 
〈ℒ〉 = ∑ Φ (
?̅?30,𝑘(𝜆)
𝜎30,𝑘(𝜆, 𝛾)
) log [Φ (
?̅?30,𝑘(𝜆)
𝜎30,𝑘(𝜆, 𝛾)
)] + [1 − Φ (
?̅?30,𝑘(𝜆)
𝜎30,𝑘(𝜆, 𝛾)
)] log [1 − Φ (
?̅?30,𝑘(𝜆)
𝜎30,𝑘(𝜆, 𝛾)
)] .
𝑁𝑡𝑟
𝑘=1
 
Our three parameters, 𝛽𝑝, 𝛽𝐼 and 𝛼3, were uncorrelated with the deviance, 𝐷 (r=0.22, 
p=0.24 for 𝛽𝑝; r=-0.12, p=0.54 for 𝛽𝐼; r=0.24, p=0.19 for 𝛼3), and 𝐷 was uncorrelated with 
average performance (r=0.22, p=0.23). This indicates that individual differences in 𝛽𝑝, 𝛽𝐼 , and 
𝛼3 are not explained by inter-individual variability in the goodness of the fit. 
Do our findings depend on the assumptions of the stochastic updating model? 
We assumed that subjects were able to compute the mean and variance following Equations 
[1] and [2]. To evaluate whether or not the idiosyncrasies in confidence depended on these 
assumptions, we considered a different model, one without the subject-to-subject distortions 
(introduced by 𝜆 and 𝛾) in the computation of ?̂?(correct) and Fisher information.  We set the 
mean value of 𝜇30 on trial 𝑘 (Equation [4]) to the true average orientation, and the perceived 
variance (Equation [2]) to the true variance. We took the inverse of the true variance to obtain 
trial-to-trial estimates of Fisher information, and used Equations [5-9] to compute ?̂?(correct). 
 [S1] 
 [S2] 
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We regressed these estimates against confidence (Equation [10]) and obtained very similar 
results to our main study. Both 𝛽𝑝 (r=0.95, p=10
-16) and 𝛽𝐼 (r=0.98, p=10
-20) were highly 
correlated across models.  
We also tested an alternative model, in which we relaxed the assumption of an ideal 
observer, and instead assumed that subjects computed the variance the same way they 
computed the mean, 
𝜎𝑖
2 = (1 − 𝜆) 𝜎𝑖−1
2 +  𝜆 𝜃𝑖
2. 
We computed ?̂?(correct) and Fisher information using Equations [4-9] and [S3], and regressed 
these values against confidence. Again, our findings were very consistent across models 
(r=0.99, p=10-26 for 𝛽𝑝 and r=0.98, p=10
-20 for 𝛽𝐼). This analysis confirms that our findings did 
not depend on the specific assumptions of the stochastic updating model.  
Neuronal encoding of all functions of variance are fundamentally indistinguishable 
In our analysis, we quantified participants’ certainty in the estimate of the mean using the 
observed Fisher information. We used Fisher information, rather than standard deviation or 
variance, only because it provided the best linear fits to confidence reports in our Control 
Experiment (see Methods). Is there a more principled way to choose a function of uncertainty? 
For instance, could we determine which one is used by the brain? The answer to the latter 
question turns out to be no: even with neuronal recordings, it would be impossible to 
distinguish which function is encoded by the brain. Indeed, if the brain encodes one function 
of variance, it automatically encodes all functions of variance. For example, if a neuronal 
population encodes Fisher information, it automatically encodes variance, 
𝑝(𝐼30|𝐫) = 𝑝(𝜎30
2 |𝐫) |
𝑑𝜎30
2
𝑑𝐼30
| = 𝑝(𝜎30
2 |𝐫) 𝜎30
4 , 
 [S3] 
 [S4] 
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where 𝐫 is the population response. Equation [S4] implies that even if we recorded the 
population activity, 𝐫, we would be unable to distinguish whether the brain encodes Fisher 
information or variance. The same analysis applies to all functions of variance. 
Correlation with objective performance 
We asked if our three model parameters (𝛽𝑝, 𝛽𝐼 and 𝛼3) were correlated with the average task 
performance. We did not find any correlation for 𝛽𝐼 (r=0.25, p=0.18) or 𝛼3 (r=0.21, p=0.27), 
but we found that 𝛽𝑝 was correlated with task performance (r=0.55, p=0.002). This is 
consistent with previous studies showing that participants with larger objective performance 
typically show larger correlation between confidence and their probability of being correct2. 
 This raises a potential concern: the stability of 𝛽𝑝 over time and across tasks might 
simply reflect the stability of performance. To evaluate this possibility we computed the partial 
correlation of 𝛽𝑝 across experiments after controlling for the mean performance on each task 
and observed that 𝛽𝑝 was still stable over time (r=0.63, p=0.025) and across domains (r=0.63, 
p=0.005). This finding suggests that even though 𝛽𝑝 correlates with performance, it still reflects 
an idiosyncratic property of confidence reports that is stable over time and across tasks 
involving uncertainty in different domains. 
Controlling for individual differences in eye movement 
We analysed electrooculography (EOG) data collected on 20 subjects while they performed 
Experiment 1. To measure individual differences in the amount of eye movement, we 
computed the EOG power (mean squared amplitude) on each trial and averaged this quantity 
across trials. We found that the EOG power did not correlate with 𝛽𝑝 (r=0.11, p=0.63), 𝛽𝐼 (r=-
0.07, p=0.75) or 𝛼3 (r=0.35, p=0.12), nor was it correlated with average performance in the 
task (r=0.09, p=0.70). 
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Supplementary Figures 
 
 
 
Supplementary Figure 1. Recency effect. To test the influence that each Gabor patch 
(Experiment 1) or number (Experiment 3) exerted on choice, we implemented a multivariate 
logistic regression where the independent variables were the orientations/numbers presented 
at each position in the sequence (with positive items favouring the clockwise/greater option 
and negative items favouring the counter-clockwise/lower option), and the dependent variable 
was the probability of giving a clockwise/greater answer (for consistency with our notation, we 
define a variable, 𝑑, that is equal to 1 in clockwise/greater decisions and -1 in counter-
clockwise/lower choices),  
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log (
𝑝(𝑑 = 1)
1 − 𝑝(𝑑 = 1)
) = 𝑤0  + ∑ 𝑤𝑖  𝜃𝑖 ,
30
𝑖=1
 
where 𝑤𝑖 measures the weight that an item presented at position 𝑖 had over choice. We ran 
this regression for all subjects separately. a) Average weights across subjects for the visual 
task (Experiment 1); the shaded area is the s.e.m. We observed that all items had a significant 
effect on choice (t(29)>3.17, p<0.003 for all item positions). We also observed a significant 
recency effect, which we quantified by fitting a line to the weights of each individual and 
comparing the distribution of slopes against zero (t(29)=4.70, p=10-6). b) This recency effect 
is captured by our model and modulated by the parameter λ in Equation [1]; larger values of 
λ (x-axis) lead to a larger influence of recent items (slope of the regression, y-axis). Each grey 
dot is a different participant of Experiment 1. We observed that subjects with a larger recency 
effect (quantified by the slope in the regression) had a larger best-fitting λ (r=0.81, p=10-7). 
Importantly, the extent to which people focus on recent items, quantified by λ, does not 
correlate with the overall performance in the task (r=-0.28, p=0.13), and it was also 
uncorrelated with the best-fitting parameters of our model of confidence (r=0.25, p=0.17 for 
𝛽𝑝, r =-0.03, p=0.85 for 𝛽𝐼, and r=0.15, p=0.42 for 𝛼3). c-d) Same as a-b) but for the numerical 
task performed in Experiment 3. c) All items had a significant effect on choice (t(19)>2.4, 
p<0.03 for all item positions). The recency effect was also significant, as quantified by the 
distribution of best-fitting slopes (t(19)=3.81, p=10-3). d) The parameters λ correlate with the 
recency effect quantified by the best-fitting slope of the regression weights (r=0.76, p=10-5). 
 
 
 
 
 
 [S5] 
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Supplementary Figure 2. Influence on choice for different variance conditions. To test if 
subjects integrated items differently depending on the variance of each trial, we implemented 
a multivariate logistic regression separately for each variance condition. To prevent overfitting, 
we considered a regression where the weights changed every 5 items, 
log (
𝑝(𝑑 = 1)
1 − 𝑝(𝑑 = 1)
) = 𝑤0  + ∑ 𝑤𝑖  ( ∑ 𝜃𝑗 
5𝑖
𝑗=5(𝑖−1)+1
) .
6
𝑖=1
 
This is very similar to Equation [S5]; the main difference (besides the grouping into 5 weights) 
is that we estimated the weights, 𝑤𝑖, for each variance condition separately. a) Visual Task 
(Experiment 1): Weights for each variance condition, averaged over subjects; error bars are 
 [S6] 
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s.e.m., and colours code for different variance conditions as in the main figures. Presentations 
in the low-variance condition had larger influence over choice, and, as in Supplementary 
Figure 1, later items had larger weights than early items (2-way repeated measures ANOVA; 
effect of item position, F(5,29)=16.19, p=10-12; effect of variance condition F(3,29)=57.8, p~0). 
We asked if these findings were consistent with our model. To test this, for each subject we 
found the best-fitting parameters λ and γ, as described in Methods, and used those to 
compute, on each trial, the probability of a clockwise option, 𝑝(𝑑 = 1) . We then used that in 
the left-hand side of Equation [S6], and ran standard linear regression to find the model 
weights. The grey dashed lines show the model weights averaged across subjects. b) 
Recency effect estimated by the best-fitting slopes of the weights obtained from data versus 
model for each variance condition. Colours code as in panel a. Each dot is a different subject. 
The model weights matched well the weights computed from data (r>0.71, p<10-5 for all four 
conditions). c-d) Same as a-b but for the numerical task (Experiment 3). c) We observed that 
later items had larger influence on choice (F(5,19)=18.4, p=10-12) and that items had less 
influence if they had higher variance (F(3,19)=19.4, p=10-8). d) The model captured individual 
differences in recency, quantified by the slope of the regression weights for each variance 
condition (r>0.63, p<0.003 for all conditions). This finding suggest that the last term in Equation 
[1], noise that scales with the size of the upcoming sample relative to the decision boundary 
(modulated by parameter γ), is not a property of the visual task but of the serial integration of 
items. To provide further support for this idea, we compared the best-fitting γ in both tasks 
(using the data collected in Experiment 3 and comparing the visual and numerical sessions) 
and observed a positive correlation (r=0.80, p=10-5). This suggests that the subjects who had 
larger integration noise in one task also had larger integration noise in the other. 
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      [S7] 
     [S8] 
] 
 
Supplementary Figure 3. Model fitting results in Experiment 1. We fit two probabilistic 
models that make different assumptions about how decisions are made. The stochastic 
updating (SU) model is described in the main text (Equations [1] and [2]). In the stochastic 
decision (SD) model, the agent makes deterministic updates, 
𝜇𝑖 = (1 − 𝜆) 𝜇𝑖−1 + 𝜆 𝜃𝑖 
 and then makes a softmax decision,  
𝑝(𝑑 = 1) =
exp(− 𝜇30/𝜏)
exp(−𝜇30/𝜏) + exp(𝜇30/𝜏)
  
where 𝑝(𝑑 = 1) is the probability of choosing clockwise and 𝜏 is the temperature of the softmax 
rule. In this model, the agent updates perfectly and uses a stochastic (and thus suboptimal) 
rule for action selection; errors are due to noise in the decisional stage. In the SU model, the 
updating process is stochastic (Equation [1] in the main text), and decisions are optimal based 
on the perceived estimate; errors are due to uncertainty in the updating process. Both models 
fit two parameters to the data of each individual. a) The SU model (solid line) but not the SD 
model (dashed line) fits the pattern of increasing performance with decreasing variance. b) 
Model comparison: negative log likelihood of the SU and SD models using the best fitting 
parameters. Each dot is a different participant. The SU model fits the data significantly better 
than the SD model (t(29)=9.0, p<10-9).  
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    [S9] 
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Supplementary Figure 4. Probing different models of confidence. Normative models 
propose that confidence should be a function of only ?̂?(correct). We compared such a model 
(M0) with 7 alternative models which linearly combine two different probabilistic quantities 
(ordinal regression, see Equation [10] in Methods). Models M1 to M3 are extensions of M0 
using a function of variance: they are based on ?̂?(correct) and a second quantity (M1: Fisher 
information, M2: variance, M3: standard deviation). Model M4 is a different extension of M0 
based on ?̂?(correct) and the perceived mean. Models M5 to M7 are alternative models to M0 
that linearly combine the perceived mean with Fisher information (M5), variance (M6), or s.d. 
(M7). The y-axis shows the difference in deviance between the extended/alternative models 
and M0. The difference in deviance is defined as two times the negative log-likelihood ratio,  
𝐷(M) − 𝐷(M0) =  −2 ∑ log (
𝑝(𝑑𝑖|M)
𝑝(𝑑𝑖|M0)
)
400
𝑖=1
, 
where 𝑝(𝑑𝑖|M) is the probability of observing decision 𝑑𝑖 given model M. More negative values 
provide stronger support for the extended/alternative model compared to M0. The boxplots 
show the distribution of difference in deviance for the 30 subjects in Experiment 1 (red line: 
median; box limits: 25 and 75-percentiles, whiskers at 1.5 times the interquartile range, red 
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crosses: outliers). We observed that models M1 to M3 were significantly more likely than M0 
(Wilcoxon sign rank test, z > 4.7, p < 10-5 for all pairwise comparisons to M0; log likelihood 
ratio test, ∆df = 30, p ~ 0), but not significantly different from each other (z < 1.7, p > 0.1 for all 
pairwise comparisons between M1, M2 and M3). The model based on ?̂?(correct) and the 
perceived mean (M4) was more likely than M0 (z = 4.7, p = 10-5, log likelihood ratio test, ∆df 
= 30, p = 10-14) but less likely than M1, M2, or M3 (z > 2.7, p < 0.006 for all pairwise 
comparisons to M4). All alternative models based on the perceived mean and a function of 
variance (M5 to M7) were significantly less likely than M0 (z > 3.2, p < 0.002 for all pairwise 
comparisons to M0). This finding indicates that confidence is not well fit by a linear combination 
of mean and variance (or mean and Fisher information or s.d.). Altogether, this analysis 
suggests that confidence is better explained by a linear combination of ?̂?(correct) and a 
function of variance. 
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Supplementary Figure 5. Control Experiment. We asked if Fisher information correlates 
with confidence or other functions of variance. (a-c): Visual task. (d-f) Numerical task. 
Participants observed a sequence of items (Gabor patches in the visual task and two-digit 
numbers in the numerical task) serially flashed at the fovea at 4 Hz, and we asked them to 
provide their analog estimate of the mean (see Methods). We observed that, as we increased 
the variance in the sequence, responses became more accurate (panel a for the visual task 
(F(3,9)=13.21, p=10-5), panel d for the numerical task F(3,9)=3.8, p=0.003) and more confident 
(panel b for the visual task, F(3,9)=37.4, p=10-9, panel e for the numerical task, F(3,9)=7.6, 
p=10-4). c and f) We regressed confidence against Fisher information (𝐼30), variance (𝜎30
2 ), or 
standard deviation (𝜎30) and measured the deviance of each model (see Equation [S9] in 
Supplementary Figure 4). The boxplots show the distribution of deviances for each model 
across subjects. In both tasks, the winning model was the one in which linear changes of 
Fisher information modulated confidence ratings (Wilcoxon sign-rank test, z > 2.8, p < 0.005 
for both pairwise comparisons in the visual task, z > 2.7, p < 0.006 for the numerical task). 
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Supplementary Figure 6. Influence of  ?̂?(𝐜𝐨𝐫𝐫𝐞𝐜𝐭) and Fisher information on reaction 
times and confidence reports. a) Mean reaction times (mRT) averaged across participants 
for each variance condition, separated into correct and incorrect trials. Horizontal lines show 
the s.e.m. We observed a significant effect of outcome (correct vs. incorrect, F(1,29)=40.6, 
p=10-7), a non-significant main effect of variance (F(3,29)=0.49, p=0.69), and a significant 
interaction (F(3,29)=4.3, p=0.007). b) We regressed reaction times against ?̂?(correct) and 
Fisher information. To do this, we used Equation [10], except with reaction time rather than 
confidence on the left hand side,  
log (
𝑝(𝑅𝑇 > 𝑗)
1 − 𝑝(𝑅𝑇 > 𝑗)
) = −𝜐𝑗 + 𝜂𝑝𝑍𝑝 + 𝜂𝐼𝑍𝐼 
where 𝑝(𝑅𝑇 > 𝑗) stands for the probability of observing a reaction time larger than the 𝑗𝑡ℎ 
sextile in the distribution. The influence of ?̂?(correct) on confidence (𝛽𝑝, x-axis) was 
significantly correlated with the influence of ?̂?(correct) on reaction times (𝜂𝑝, y-axis) (r=-0.61, 
p=10-4). c) The influence of Fisher information on confidence (𝛽𝐼, x-axis) was significantly 
correlated with the influence of Fisher information on reaction times (𝜂𝐼, y-axis) (r=-0.49, 
p=0.005). We also observed a non-significant correlation between 𝛽𝑝 and 𝜂𝐼 (r=-0.06, p=0.75) 
and between 𝛽𝐼 and 𝜂𝑝 (r=-0.15, p=0.41). These findings suggest that the contribution of 
?̂?(correct)  and Fisher information to confidence is not simply reflected in confidence reports, 
but also in reaction times. The negative correlation between the regressors is consistent with 
the idea that confidence might be, at least partially, based on decision time3. 
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Supplementary Figure 7. Analysis of confidence across domains. Same as the main 
panel in Fig. 3 of the main text, except that both tasks of Experiment 3 are also included here. 
Regression weights on confidence for different individuals. x-axis: weight of the probability of 
being correct (𝛽𝑝); y-axis: weight of information (𝛽𝐼). Each marker (circle, diamond, or square) 
represents one experiment. The colour codes for significance (at the 0.05 level) are as follows: 
dark green, only 𝛽𝑝 was significant; light green, both 𝛽𝑝 and 𝛽𝐼 were significant; yellow, only 
𝛽𝐼 was significant; grey, neither was significant. Circles: 30 participants performing the visual 
task in Experiment 1. Diamonds: 20 other participants performing the visual task in Experiment 
3. Squares: the same 20 participants of Experiment 3 performing the numerical task.  
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Supplementary Figure 8. Stability in Experiment 3. Stability within each experiment for the 
visual (a-c) and numerical (d-f) task.  For each half of the experiment (200 trials each), we 
decomposed confidence in terms of the weight of ?̂?(correct) (𝛽𝑝), the weight of information 
(𝛽𝐼), and the overall confidence (𝛼3). Correlation across halves for 𝛽𝑝 (a/d), 𝛽𝐼 (b/e), and 𝛼3 
(c/f). Each square is a different participant, the dotted line is the identity, and the value of r 
given in each box is the Pearson correlation coefficient. All three variables are stable within 
each experiment for both the visual and numerical task.  
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